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Voters and party activists are drawn to a particular political party, at least in part, because of its 
ideological/issue profile.
2  Hence, changing that profile could result in losing current members 
and/or voters.  Precisely because a party can not assume that such change would be cost-free, 
parties are generally assumed to undertake it reluctantly. 
 
And yet, there is ample evidence that parties do change their profiles, both in their positions and 
in the relative degrees to which they emphasize particular issues, and sometimes the changes are 
dramatic.  Why, in the face of good reasons for standing pat, do parties change?  In addition to 
possible internal factors, such as changes in who controls the party’s own positions of power, 
recent literature has focused a good deal of attention on pressures and opportunities from outside 
the party (i.e., “environmental” factors).  (E.g., see Harmel and Svasand 1997; Demker 1997; 
Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992) 
 
With all of the attention that has been given to environmental explanation for party change, with 
special attention devoted to the parties of established European democracies, surprisingly little 
has been focused on possible impact of what might well be considered the most dramatic recent 
change in the shared environment of those parties: the development of “Europe,” both 
institutionally and in the minds of its people.  It is our purpose in this paper to add to the small 
but important literature which has developed on this subject, by directly and empirically 
investigating the extent to which European integration and institutionalization have contributed 
to convergence and altered emphases within several major party families covering the fifteen 
more established member states of the European Union.   
 
To what extent has the development of “Europe” contributed to altered issue profiles of national 
parties?  That is the question which drives this paper. 
 
 
 
1The three co-authors bear equal responsibility for this paper.  The ordering is 
chronological, reflecting the order of joining the project. 
 
2To simplify presentation, we will henceforth refer only to issue profile and no longer 
distinguish between ideological and issue profiles, subsuming the former under the latter.  
 
Extant Literature 
 
In addition to a limited number of studies focusing on individual parties, party systems, or party 
families, there are only a few studies which cover the broad range of European party families 
involved in the current study.  One of those (Volkens and Klingemann 2002) aims to explain 
recent polarization and/or convergence in European party systems and only briefly engages the 
same for party families, while the second (Pennings 2004) focuses upon both individual parties 
and party families in analyzing possible effects of Europeanization upon references to Europe in 
party manifestos.  
 
Volkens and Klingemann focus primarily upon the extents to which the period from the 1940s to 
1990s has seen greater polarization or convergence among left-right party positions within the 
national party systems and among the major party families of Europe, using composite position 
scores based upon data of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG).  The study only briefly touches 
upon the topic of primary interest in our study, intra-party family convergence, finding that  
 
High standard deviations show that parties grouped into the same party family vary 
considerably in their left-right placements.  Contrary to our hypotheses that 
internationalization and globalization processes militate in favour of party families 
becoming more similar, these data show that only left-wing party families grew more 
similar over time.  A comparison of standard deviations for the six decades [from the 
1940s through 1990s] show only communist, socialist, green, Christian democratic, and 
regional parties getting closer.  Conservative, nationalist, liberal, agrarian/centre, and 
special issue parties show greater divergence during the 1980s or 1990s, although some 
of these party families had previously been getting more similar.  (2002: 158) 
 
Beyond the broad left-right composite positions, Volkens and Klingemann treat only two issues 
which “gained prominence over time,” finding that eventually all party families devoted 
increased attention to the valence issues of the environment and administrative efficiency. 
 
In his study of the effects of Europeanization upon national platforms, Pennings examines 
differences across parties/families and over time in the extent to which manifestos reference the 
European level, both generally and by specific policy domain.  Relying primarily upon original 
data produced by automated content analysis, Pennings (2004: 12) finds that 
 
Overall, the linkages to Europe per policy domain are not strongly related to the party 
family background... However, the party families do slightly incorporate the linkages into 
their manifestos in the way predicted by the issue saliency theory.  
 
He concludes that “Europeanization has generally got less attention than would be warranted by 
its ‘objective’ impact on national decision- and policy-making,” and that  “party family 
differences do matter for the degree to which policy areas get linked to Europe, but this impact is 
not very strong” (2004: 1, 17). 
  
 
Concepts: European Integration and Europeanization
 
Confusion in the literature over the use – or rather, variety of uses – of the term 
“Europeanization” has been well documented elsewhere (e.g., see Bomberg 2002; Radaelli 
2000).  For our purposes, the most fundamental distinctions are (1) between those which 
highlight institutionalization at the European level and others which focus on Europe’s impacts 
on national politics, and (2) those which speak only of the European Community/Union and 
others which refer more broadly to the European level.   As illustrations of these definitional 
alternatives, consider just the following three attempts to define the single term: 
 
In one of the most cited definitions, Ladrech (1994: 69) has conceptualized Europeanization as 
an 
 
incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national 
politics and policy-making. 
 
Later, Ladrech (as cited in Bomberg 2002, endnote #12) has seemingly broadened his definition 
to include  
 
  Responses by actors – institutional and otherwise – to the impact of European integration. 
 
In another highly cited definition, Risse, Green-Cowles, and Caporaso (2001: 3) define 
Europeanization as 
 
the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.  
 
To us, Ladrech’s definitions seem too broad from a social scientific perspective; that is, they 
subsume both the independent variable (what’s happening at the European level) and the most 
interesting dependent variable (responses at the national level) within one concept.  Thus, it is no 
longer possible to speak of “national-level responses to Europeanization” or in our case to ask 
“what are the implications of Europeanization for national parties,” since the 
responses/implications are considered by Ladrech to be parts of Europeanization.  And hence, 
the national-level effects become indicators rather than hypothesized consequences of 
Europeanization. 
 
We prefer usage closer to that of Risse et al, where the definitional focus remains on the 
European level alone.  For us, Europeanization is the development of political and governmental 
institutions at the European level.  And for us, the relevant institutions may be developed within 
the European Community/Union or within other European-level organizations/associations, e.g. 
the Common Market, Schengen, or the Single European Act.  What they have in common is the  
 
institutionalization of increased opportunities for regular interaction among officials of European 
states. 
 
Just as there is disagreement and resulting confusion concerning the meaning of the term 
“Europeanization,” there is also disagreement and confusion over “European integration.”  Is it 
integration of institutions across nation-states, for instance, or does the integration occur within 
the minds of individuals?  We adopt the latter option.  For us, European integration involves the 
development of European identity and a common European culture; here, emphasis is placed on 
a process which occurs within the minds of European residents, whether of the elites or the 
masses. 
 
Thus defined, both Europeanization and European integration are developmental processes.  
They are not the same thing, but each could presumably affect the other.  Theoretically, we 
hypothesize that both may impact party behavior at the national level. 
 
Theory
 
With increasingly higher levels of European integration, a process begun in earnest in the 
aftermath of World War II and certainly continuing today, have come greater opportunities to 
learn from successes and failures of others on the continent.  This is true governmentally (across 
national governments and their agencies), but also politically (across political parties and other 
political organizations at the national level).  Development of European institutions (i.e, 
Europeanization) also institutionalized those opportunities through regular meetings of national 
leaders.  From the standpoint of national parties, the developments of  popular elections for the 
European Parliament and of European party federations, in particular,  created and regularized 
both opportunities and new incentives for cooperating with and learning from fellow party 
family members in other European countries.  
 
The theoretical core of this paper is the expectation that European integration, by enhancing 
opportunities for cross-national discussion and  learning within party families, would likely have 
produced a convergence of issue profiles for parties within each family – that is, Social 
Democratic parties becoming more alike, Conservative parties becoming more alike, etc.  The 
process should only have been spurred on by development of European institutions, within which 
the communications and learning would be regularized and routinized.  Though Volkens and 
Klingemann looked briefly for the same phenomenon and found only limited evidence of such 
convergence (i.e. limited just to party families of the left), they limited their analysis to 
composite left-right scores; our expectation is broader than that and covers a range of specific 
issues over which discussion is likely to take place in European venues (see Table 5). 
 
But what specifically, within the parties’ issue profiles, would be expected to converge?  First 
and foremost, we would expect that for a range of issues, the actual positions taken by the parties 
would become more similar within each family over time.  While Volkens and Klingemann 
purport to have analyzed parties’ positions, operationalized as composite scores based on 
Manifestos Research Group data for a number of allegedly left-right issues, the reality is that the  
 
MRG data were designed to measure relative amounts of attention paid to specific issues, not 
actual positions.  Hence, we would argue (following Harmel, Janda, and Tan 1995) that Volkens 
and Klingemann were analyzing issue “salience” more so than issue positions.  And we see no 
sound reason to expect either European integration or Europeanization to produce convergent 
salience within party families.  Any European-level learning (or perhaps even pressures) would 
likely produce greater conformity on positions taken by family parties, while leaving salience 
exclusively  to the purview of national politics. 
 
But for some issues, i.e. the non-valence issues, parties may conceivably make statements 
seemingly supporting both sides of an issue within a single manifesto.  The MRG project 
produced data for several such issues (some of which are customarily included in attempts to 
measure “position” on the basis of “relative emphasis”).   While we are loathe to consider the 
difference between the quantities of “positive” and “negative” statements to indicate the party’s 
actual position on an issue, we do recognize that parties may be strategic in weighting the 
amount of emphasis given to one side relative to the other.  While this stops short of indicating 
position (which requires determining the strength and not just quantity of the statements), it may 
well reflect the party’s attempt to establish a particular “tone” for strategic reasons.  And because 
strategy may well be a topic for sharing and learning among the members of a particular party 
family, we do expect that European integration, spurred on by Europeanization, would result in 
convergence of tone on particular issues within each party family. 
 
Beyond convergences within party families, there are certain issues for which European 
integration, again spurred on by Europeanization, would be expected to lessen the manifesto 
emphasis (or salience) across all parties.  Because European integration implies development of a 
European “community,” for instance, there should be lessened importance attached to any 
“special,” friendly dyadic relationships, either within or outside of Europe.  And because of the 
expectation (and in some aspects, objective reality) of shifting responsibility for economic 
orthodoxy (e.g. banking and monetary systems) to the European level as part of Europeanization, 
there should be lessened attention paid to economic orthodoxy at the national level. 
 
Thus far, then, we are positing greater convergence of position and tone within party families for 
a range of issues, and declining emphasis on positive dyadic foreign relationships and economic 
orthodoxy for parties in general.  Tests of these expectations will constitute the first section of 
analyses below.  For these hypotheses, we do not (and indeed are unable to) differentiate 
between effects of European integration and development of European institutions, noting only 
that we would not be surprised to find even stronger support beginning with the period of 
greatest institutional development (i.e. the mid-1970s onward).   We should note also that we 
have no intention of trying to measure the alleged “independent variables” nor to control for 
possible rival explanations (e.g. the end of the Cold War or broader trends associated with 
globalization and internationalization).  Rather, we shall be content here to note when evidence is 
consistent with what we would anticipate as consequences of [unmeasured] tandem trends of 
European integration and Europeanization.  When evidence conforms to our expectations, we 
must stop well short of drawing causal inferences.  When evidence does not conform to our 
expectations, we will be more confident in doubting the related hypotheses of European effects.  
 
                                                
 
The second portion of the analyses focuses upon expected effects of one particular aspect of 
Europeanization: the writing of European party federation manifestos (i.e., Euromanifestos).   
Most European party federations – encompassing their respective EP party groups, national party 
executives, and others – were formed in advance of the first direct elections to the EP in 1979.   
Party Leaders’ Meetings, consisting primarily of the leaders of the  EP party group and the 
national parties, are normally held at least twice per year.  These leadership meetings set the 
agenda for the EP and have produced Euromanifestos for each of the EP elections beginning 
with 1979.
3   With these functions, according to Hix and Lord (1997, 65), “The Party Leaders’ 
Meetings have begun to play a new role in coordinating the development of party policy on 
issues in EU politics at national and European level.” 
 
Taking the national-level implications of the latter statement as research challenge rather than 
established fact, we do believe there is good reason to anticipate effects of the Party Leader 
Meetings – and their tremendous opportunity for diffusing policy orientations and strategy – 
upon national manifestos, with the Euromanifesto serving as guide to both national parties and to 
our specific expectations.  The process of developing the Euromanifesto involves leaders of all 
national parties within the federation.  Though it may be assumed that most or all of what is 
included in the Euromanifesto has received consensus approval (as in Hix and Lord 1997: 65-
67), that does not necessarily mean that all member parties are at exactly the same position, 
stated with exactly the same tone.  For that matter, it should not be assumed that every national 
party has even addressed all of the issues in its platform; it may be that some parties consent to 
including an item simply because it has not heretofore been relevant in their national politics   
Hence, there is reason to expect that there is room for convergence among federation members 
on position, tone, and emphasis (i.e., at the level of recognizing issues not included in previous 
national platforms), even for issues covered in “consensual” Euromanifestos.   
 
Specifically, then, we expect that when an issue has been emphasized (operationalized here as 
receiving at least 5% of all statements) in a given Euromanifesto, there should be fewer member 
parties afterwards who do not address the issue at the national level.  Regarding “tone,” there 
should also be convergence in the direction of the Euromanifesto’s tone (i.e. positive or negative) 
for such issues.  And finally, there should be convergence of national parties’ actual positions 
toward the specific positions emphasized in the Euromanifesto.  Though data (i.e. judgmental 
data on actual positions in Euromanifestos) do not exist for testing the last of those expectations, 
data do exist with which to address the hypotheses relating Euromanifesto emphases to national 
party recognition and tone.   
 
 
 
 
 
3According to Hix and Lord (1997: 65), “By bringing prime ministers and European 
Commissioners together, the Party Leaders’ Meetings are the only arenas where all the officials 
fulfilling executive functions at the European level from the same party family meet to discuss 
the medium- and long-term EU agenda.”  
Data and Findings
 
Part One: European Integration and Europeanization 
 
Above, we posited greater convergence of position and tone within party families for a range of 
issues for which discussion at the European level is likely.  For testing the hypothesis for actual 
issue positions, we are limited to judgmental data produced for the Party Change Project for 
parties of just three European countries (Denmark, Germany, and the U.K.) for the period 1950-
1990.  (See Harmel, Janda, and Tan 1995.)  Thus, issue position data exist for no more than 
three parties per party family.  With such limited data, only the most tentative of findings can be 
reported.  Nevertheless, for the Social Democrats and Liberals (the only families for which data 
are sufficient to support any analysis), there does appear to be (in analyses not reported in detail 
here) some convergence, but only for a limited number of issues and over limited periods of 
time.  There was some indication that new EU membership drew parties closer within the Social 
Democratic family.  But again, very little should be made of these indications, which were 
based on behavior of only a few parties.  At best, they are suggestive of the need for further 
analysis of convergence of party positions in European party families. 
 
For analysis of convergence in tone, we rely upon data collected by the Manifesto Research 
Group on those issues for which  “pro” and “con” statements were counted separately (see 
Table 5).
4  Thus, for each such variable, our operationalization of tone is the net emphasis in the 
dominant direction, i.e. simply the arithmetic difference between the percentages of “pro” and 
“con” statements.
5   
  
To examine convergences within each party family the standard deviation and the mean of net 
emphasis for each issue are calculated for each five-year period between 1945 and 1998. The 
degree of convergence is operationalized as the standard deviation itself.  Thus measured, as the 
specific party family under analysis experiences convergence, the standard deviation decreases. 
Means, on the other hand, provide information on the direction of convergence. While higher 
means with lower standard deviations indicate convergence toward more emphasis, lower 
means combined with lower standard deviations indicate convergence toward less emphasis. 
6To eliminate the possible bias caused by the same party having more than one manifesto within 
                                                 
 
4For our analysis, we excluded two such variables – traditional morality and “labor 
groups” – for which, during the period of our study (ending in 1998), were predominantly 
national issues which are unlikely to have received substantial treatment in European-level 
discussion. 
 
5Indeed, the reason for excluding valence issues is that there is no similar indicator of 
tone for such issues.  That is, the data are limited to measuring salience, i.e. emphasis. 
 
 
   
a five year period, the average of the net emphasis scores for the party’s manifestos for each 
period was taken as that party’s score.   To eliminate possible noise caused by parties leaving 
the scene (i.e. dying) or coming onto the scene (i.e. being born) during the period of our study, 
results reported here are based on analyses of just the parties that have survived for the whole 
period of the data set (i.e. from 1945 to 1998).
7   Analyses include – throughout the entire 
period – the parties of all 15 European countries which were EU members as of 1998.  Finally, 
this study is limited to the four largest mainstream party families in Europe.
8
  
The standard deviations and means for the issues under consideration are reported in Tables 1-4, 
separately for each party family.  Table 5 consists of a summary report on convergences and 
divergences. As can be seen, for all party families under examination there are considerably 
more convergences than divergences, as hypothesized.
9  The Social Democrats converged for 
the issues of foreign special relations, military, constitutionalism, education, and 
multiculturalism. The Liberals converged for the issues of foreign special relations, 
protectionism, and multiculturalism. The Conservatives converged for foreign special relations, 
constitutionalism, and protectionism.  Finally, the Christian Democrats converged for the issues 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
6Two other formulae were also used to analyze the movements of the party families, 
following Volkens and Klingemann (2002).  The first is the difference between the maximum 
and minimum scores within each five-year period.  For the second, the differences for all 
possible pairs of parties within each five-year period were computed, summed, and divided by 
the number of parties minus one. These later two formulae are very highly correlated and there 
are only minor differences between the results of these formulae and the results based on the 
standard deviations. For clearer presentation, the standard deviations and means are chosen for 
this paper. 
 
7The hypotheses were also tested for the sets of parties that include (1) all parties that 
existed for some part of the period and (2) all parties except those that died prior to 1998.  The 
findings for all three sets of analyses are very similar. 
 
8Of the six largest party families, the Greens and Communists are excluded here.  The 
Greens are excluded because most family members have existed for too short a time to support 
an analysis of convergence.  The Communists are excluded because too few remain (only four) 
when analyzing just parties that survived through 1998. 
 
9To account for the possibility that anti-European parties could produce outlier effects 
counter to our hypothesis, we differentiated parties on the basis of the degree of negativity on 
the European Community issue.  Only a few parties were found to be clearly anti-European 
Community/Union.  While some anti-EC/U parties were found to be outliers for some issues, 
they were not found to be influential in biasing standard deviations or means. 
 
 
  8 
of foreign special relations, constitutionalism, protectionism, and national way of life.  When 
the means are analyzed, for almost all of the convergences (except for the issues of education 
and multiculturalism in the case of the Social Democrats) the convergences involve generalized 
movement toward net emphases of 0, resulting in most instances from lessened emphasis on the 
issue overall.    
 
Above, we argued that there are certain issues for which European integration, spurred on by 
Europeanization, would be expected to lessen the manifesto emphasis across all parties, 
regardless of family.  Specifically, we posited declining emphasis on positive dyadic foreign 
relationships and economic orthodoxy. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present the emphasis scores for these two issues for all parties (which were in 
existence throughout the period) across our entire period of study.  The Figures reveal the 
expected tendencies for both issues, strongly for friendly dyadic foreign relationships and more 
moderately for economic orthodoxy.   Fewer parties devoted substantial portions of their 
platforms to these issues at the end of the period than at the beginning.  For the foreign 
relationships variable, not only did the standard deviations decline over time, but the means 
clearly declined as well.   
 
 
  
FIGURE 1*: Party emphasis for the issue of ‘Foreign Special Relations- Positive’** 
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* Each point refers to a party manifesto. If more than one election manifesto is 
published within a five-year period the average of the emphasis scores for that period 
are used here. Parties that have survived for the whole period are represented in the 
figure, regardless of party family. 
** y-axis represents emphasis placed on the issue, as a percentage of all sentences in the manifesto, as 
provided by the MRG. 
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FIGURE 2*: Party emphasis for the issue of ‘Economic Orthodoxy’** 
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* Each point refers to a party manifesto. If more than one election manifesto is published within a 
five-year period the average of the emphasis scores for that period are used here. Parties that have 
survived for the whole period are represented in the figure, regardless of party family. 
**y-axis represents emphasis placed on the issue, as a percentage of all sentences in the manifesto, as 
provided by the MRG. 
 
Thus far, our purpose has been to present evidence concerning expectations of greater 
convergence of position and tone within party families and of declining emphasis on the issues 
of positive foreign dyadic relationships and economic orthodoxy.   While it was not possible to 
adequately address the convergence hypothesis with respect to position, we did find evidence  
consistent with our expectations regarding convergence of tone.  Likewise, the data provided 
evidence of declining emphases on issues involving foreign relationships and economic 
orthodoxy.  While none of these findings should be interpreted as confirming a role for 
“Europe” in altering national party issue profiles, they are at least consistent with what would be 
expected if Europe did have such a role. 
 
[Tables 1-4 go here] 
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Table 1: Social Democrats: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998* 
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Dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev  M
1945  4.2  -0.1 2.7  -1.1 2.1  2.0 0.7  0.4 2.1  0.3 1.5  0.6 0.3  0.0 5.0  7.4 2.8 
1950  7.5  1.9 3.6  -0.8 2.5  2.4 1.8  0.3 5.1  2.0 0.3  0.2 0.9  0.4 5.9  6.5 3.5 
1955  2.5  0.5 3.1  -1.1 1.9  1.5 1.1  1.0 2.6  1.1 1.1  0.8 1.7  0.4 6.0  8.5 5.9 
1960  1.6  0.9 1.7  -0.1 2.2  2.5 1.5  1.7  12.8  -2.8 1.5  1.4 1.0  0.2 7.8  12.2 3.8 
1965  2.2  0.4 1.5  -0.6 1.8  2.3 1.6  1.3 3.0  -0.1 1.5  0.9 1.6  0.2 5.9  7.2 5.1 
1970  1.7  0.0 1.1  -0.1 2.1  1.8 1.5  0.7 2.3  0.1 2.5  1.2 0.5  0.2 4.9  8.3 2.6 
1975  3.7  0.9 1.1  -0.3 2.5  2.2 2.5  0.9 1.3  0.4 1.3  1.2 0.7  0.4 4.7  8.3 2.6 
1980  1.8  0.8 1.6  -0.8 2.8  2.1 1.5  0.8 2.6  -0.3 2.4  1.4 0.3  0.0 4.3  8.3 3.2 
1985  1.6  0.3 2.0  -0.5 2.8  3.1 2.4  1.9 1.3  0.0 1.6  1.3 0.9  -0.2  10.2  10.7 2.4 
1990  0.3  0.2 1.2  -0.1 2.1  3.4 2.2  2.2 0.4  0.2 1.8  1.8 0.3  -0.2 6.3  7.1 3.3 
1995  1.3  0.8 0.2  0.1 1.2  2.7 3.5  3.9 0.5  -0.1 1.9  1.2 0.3  0.0 3.5  5.9 2.6 
* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high 
means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the 
parties within the party family. 
** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows 
the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to 
data availability. 
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Table 2: Liberals: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998* 
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Dev Mean 
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dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev M
1945  3.3  0.9 1.2  0.3 1.5  1.2 1.6  0.8 2.8  1.6 1.5  1.2 1.7  -0.7 5.5  4.9 1.7 
1950  3.0  1.9 3.5  -0.2 3.9  2.5 1.6  1.6 1.4  0.8 1.8  0.4 0.9  -0.3 5.1  4.5 2.3 
1955  2.7  1.3 2.9  -0.7 1.7  1.7 2.2  1.9 1.4  0.6 1.5  0.7 1.5  -0.8 5.8  2.7 3.9 
1960  2.1  0.8 1.7  0.2 4.9  4.0 1.7  1.6 1.0  0.5 2.7  1.8 0.7  -0.6 4.7  6.8 3.8 
1965  3.2  1.8 2.9  -0.9 5.4  3.9 1.3  1.8 2.6  1.3 1.8  1.1 0.4  -0.1  13.0  7.5 3.9 
1970  1.5  0.6 0.8  0.3 3.8  3.0 1.4  1.5 1.1  0.3 2.0  1.8 0.3  -0.1 5.1  4.4 3.3 
1975  0.6  0.3 1.7  0.4 1.7  2.0 1.9  1.9 2.0  0.7 2.2  1.7 0.3  -0.1 5.7  6.5 2.6 
1980  0.9  0.5 2.9  0.0 2.0  2.5 1.4  1.4 2.1  -0.3 1.4  1.7 0.3  -0.2 3.7  4.8 1.8 
1985  0.6  0.3 2.9  0.7 3.5  3.3 2.5  2.6 2.8  1.3 1.7  2.2 0.3  -0.1 4.6  3.4 3.3 
1990  1.4  0.6 2.8  1.4 1.8  2.5 4.0  3.5 0.9  0.0 1.1  1.4 0.4  -0.2 7.9  1.8 3.3 
1995  0.2  0.1 0.9  0.6 2.9  2.9 3.7  3.1 3.0  1.3 1.9  2.2 0.3  0.0 4.1  1.3 3.4 
* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high 
means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the 
parties within the party family. 
** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows 
the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to 
data availability. 
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Table 3: Conservatives: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998* 
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Dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev  M
1945  2.8  1.9 1.8  1.3 1.2  0.6 0.0  0.0 0.2  -0.1 1.4  0.6 1.0  0.7 5.7  5.5 2.2 
1950  1.9  1.2 1.3  1.0 0.8  0.5 0.3  0.1 4.7  -1.6 2.0  1.6 0.3  0.3 3.3  2.8 1.9 
1955  1.2  0.8 1.3  0.9 3.7  2.3 0.2  0.1  13.4  -6.0 1.9  1.3 1.5  0.7 4.8  0.9 3.5 
1960  1.6  1.2 1.6  1.2 2.4  1.4 2.5  1.6  12.3  -5.3 2.3  2.1 1.1  -0.4 4.6  2.5 1.6 
1965  2.4  0.4 0.2  0.1 0.7  1.1 0.8  0.9 5.5  -2.7 1.0  1.2 0.5  -0.2 3.5  3.2 2.9 
1970  4.6  -1.4  1.3 1.0  0.8 0.9  1.5 1.1  0.6 0.1  1.2 1.2  0.2 0.1  4.4 3.7  3.4 
1975  0.6  0.1 1.5  1.9 0.8  0.9 0.8  0.8 1.8  0.7 0.8  0.4 2.9  1.9  18.6  11.4 3.4 
1980  0.6  0.0 2.5  1.1 1.7  1.7 0.7  1.0 0.9  -0.1 1.1  0.5 0.2  0.0 5.7  4.1 3.2 
1985  1.2  0.8 5.9  5.0 1.3  1.0 2.0  1.6 0.1  0.0 0.9  1.0 0.5  -0.2  13.0  11.4 1.8 
1990  0.6  0.5 1.2  1.4 0.7  2.6 4.3  5.9 0.0  0.7 3.1  2.3 0.3  -0.2 2.8  5.3 2.5 
1995  0.1  0.1 0.6  0.4 1.1  0.2 4.0  2.5 1.5  0.0 2.0  5.2 0.6  -0.1 2.8  2.6 2.5 
* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high 
means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the 
parties within the party family. 
** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows 
the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to 
data availability. 
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Table 4: Christian Democrats: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998* 
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Dev Mean 
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dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Mean 
St 
dev Me
1945  2.4  1.2 0.8  0.5 1.5  1.0 0.0  0.0 2.9  1.3 0.3  -0.1 1.6  0.2 3.6  4.4 0.8 
1950  3.0  -0.6 0.7  0.3 1.5  1.2 0.7  0.3 1.7  1.6 1.0  0.7 1.1  0.9 4.8  6.5 1.9 
1955  3.9  3.2 1.1  0.8 1.1  0.9 2.2  2.2 3.1  3.0 0.6  0.4 0.2  0.1 2.4  4.0 4.0 
1960  3.9  0.1 1.3  1.5 1.6  1.7 3.6  3.4 2.4  1.3 1.2  1.3 2.3  1.0 2.7  8.2 1.8 
1965  2.4  1.0 1.4  1.3 1.3  0.8 2.7  2.7 0.8  0.7 2.3  2.6 0.4  0.1 3.9  5.7 4.8 
1970  4.3  1.0 1.3  1.3 0.8  1.3 2.9  2.7 2.0  1.9 1.2  0.2 0.5  0.2 6.0  6.0 2.4 
1975  2.3  1.0 1.4  0.8 0.6  1.3 1.6  1.6 1.3  1.2 1.1  1.7 1.1  0.3 4.5  9.2 1.5 
1980  1.1  0.3 1.7  0.6 1.1  1.5 1.6  1.6 1.5  -0.2 0.7  1.2 0.8  0.1 3.8  5.9 2.7 
1985  1.7  1.5 1.1  1.0 1.0  1.1 7.8  7.0 1.4  1.0 0.4  0.5 0.5  -0.2 4.1  4.7 3.2 
1990  0.4  0.3 0.5  0.4 3.4  4.9 1.8  3.5 1.0  0.7 1.8  2.3 0.2  -0.1 3.2  4.7 2.0 
1995  0.0  0.0 1.6  0.8 1.1  0.9 2.8  3.1 0.0  0.0 5.6  5.2 0.1  0.0 3.2  4.0 3.9 
* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high 
means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the 
parties within the party family. 
** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows 
the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to 
data availability. 
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TABLE 5: Convergences and divergences by party family
*  
  Social Dem  Liberals  Conservatives  Christian Dem 
Foreign Special Relat.  convergence convergence convergence
4 convergence
6
Military  convergence NC  NC  NC 
Internationalism  NC NC NC NC 
European Community  divergence divergence divergence NC 
Constitutionalism  convergence
1 NC convergence  convergence 
Centralization  divergence NC  NC  NC 
Protectionism  NC convergence  convergence
5 convergence
7
Welfare State  NC NC NC NC 
Education  convergence NC  NC  NC 
National Way of Life  NC NC NC convergence 
Multiculturalism  convergence
2 convergence
3 NC NC 
* The convergences and divergences are not necessarily cover the whole period. However, if not stated otherwise, 
all convergences and divergences are observed for most of the period under examination. Exceptions are noted 
below. 
* NC means either not clear or no change. 
1- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1960-64 period.  
2- The Social Democrats converged between 1950 and 1965 and then converged again from 1975 onwards, 
punctuated by a period of little change.  The later period of convergence coincides with the high European 
institutionalization from the late 1970s onward. 
3- Convergence is observed for the whole period except the 1965-74 period. 
4- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1970-74 period. 
5- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1975-79 period. 
6- Convergence is observed since the 1970-74 period. Before this period there was no clear change.  The  period of 
convergence coincides with the high European institutionalization from the late 1970s onward. 
7- Convergence is observed since the 1975-79 period. Before this period there was no clear change.  The period of 
convergence coincides with the high European institutionalization from the late 1970s onward. 
 
 
Part Two: Euromanifestos 
 
Above (see Theory section), we argued that there is reason to expect convergence among 
federation members on issue emphasis, at least to the extent that issues not previously treated in 
a party’s national manifestos should be mentioned there following emphasis in its federation’s 
Euromanifesto.  Operationally, we expect that when an issue has been emphasized in a  
Euromanifesto – i.e. receiving attention in at least 5% of all statements – there should be fewer 
member parties afterwards who do not address the issue at the national level.   
 
Our method involves comparing, for each issue and each family, (a) the proportion of non-
mentions (i.e. over at least three prior manifestos) changed to mentions during the five year 
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period after being emphasized in a Euromanifesto to (b) the proportion of non-mentions 
changed to mentions during a five year period after a Euromanifesto in which the same issue 
was not emphasized.
10  The magnitude (and significance, of course) of the difference between 
the two proportions serves as an indicator of the degree to which emphasis in a Euromanifesto 
may affect at least recognition of the issue in national platforms.   All Euromanifesto data used 
in this study have been provided by the Euromanifesto Project (EP), which has employed 
similar coding procedures to those of the MRG.  
 
For the vast majority (24 of 31, or 74%) of all family-issue combinations for which there were 
non-mentions at the beginning of the period, the proportion of changes associated with 
Euromanifestos in which the issues were emphasized exceeds the comparable proportion for 
control periods, consistent with our expectations.
11  Furthermore, in the aggregate, the 
proportion associated with EM’s where and issue was emphasized is 51/98 (or 52%), compared 
to just  24/99 (or 24%); the difference is significant at the .05 level.
12   
 
Similar differences in the expected direction exist for component federation families.  Though 
federations now exist for all major party families in Europe, our analyses are limited to the three 
federations that encompass the four largest mainstream party families in Europe: the Party of 
European Socialists (Socialists and Social Democrats; PES); the European Peoples’ Party (i.e. 
Conservatives and Christian Democrats; EPP); and the European Liberal, Democratic, and 
Reform Party (ELDR).   For each federation, our analyses cover the four manifestos ending 
with 1994.  For  all three federation families, proportions of change associated with EM’s in 
which issues were emphasized exceed the proportions for control periods [19/38 (50%) vs. 
11/39 (28%) for PES; 21/42 (50%) vs. 8/40 (20%) for the EPP; 8/14 (57%) vs. 5/16 (31%) for 
ELDR]; only the difference for the ELDR failed of significance at the .05 level.
13   Together, 
these results indicate that the federations’ Euromanifestos – and/or the federation-level meetings 
and processes reflected in those documents – could indeed have been a catalyst for national 
parties to recognize and mention issues which had previously been ignored.    
 
                                                 
 
10Generally, the “control” period is five years after the closest prior EM where the issue 
was not emphasized.   In the case of first instance of emphasis being in the first EM (i.e. 1979), 
the control period is 1974-1978. 
 
11In this study, we found no instances of national parties changing from “mentioning” to 
“not mentioning” in the next national manifesto after the issue had been emphasized in a 
relevant Euromanifesto.  
 
12We used the difference of proportions test as described in Blalock (1972: 228-230).  
The reported difference would also be significant at the .01 level. 
 
13The difference reported for the ELDP would be significant at the .10 level. 
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In addition to expecting convergence of issue recognition across federation members, our 
arguments above also lead us to expect convergence in direction of tone (or net emphasis), i.e. 
increases in federation members adopting the same tone as expressed in Euromanifestos for 
emphasized issues.   Parties which did not recognize the issue previously, but which do so after 
emphasis in an EM, should adopt tone with the same dominant sign (+ or -) as that of the EM.  
Parties which previously recognized the issue but with different dominant sign, should – after 
emphasis of the issue in an EM – adopt the same dominant sign as in the EM. 
 
Our data include twenty instances of change from non-mention to mention after EM emphasis; 
all were in the expected direction.  Furthermore, of thirteen instances of parties holding contrary 
tone prior to EM emphasis, five changed signs to the expected direction, seven moved in the 
expected direction but without changing sign, and only one increased its strength of tone in the 
contrary direction.  There was no instance of a party switching to a dominant sign contrary to 
that of its EM.    
 
These analyses were premised on the argument that if Euromanifestos make a difference in 
party issue profiles at the national level, it may well be revealed in (1) convergence of issue 
recognition among federation members as well as (2) convergence of tone.  Our analyses have 
provided considerable evidence in support of those expectations. 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
We began this paper by arguing that European integration, by enhancing opportunities for cross-
national discussion and learning, and spurred on by development of European institutions, 
would likely have produced a convergence of issue profiles for parties within each party family. 
With regard to European integration and Europeanization writ large, we posited greater 
convergence of position and tone within party families for a range of issues, and declining 
emphasis on two specific issues for parties in general.  With regard to Euromanifestos in 
particular, we posited convergence of issue position, issue recognition, and tone among 
members of party federations.   
 
Though data do not exist with which to adequately address our expectations regarding issue 
position convergence, we have tested the expectations involving tone, emphasis, and 
recognition.  While there were cases of divergence of issue tone, and some that neither 
converged or diverged, the instances of divergence were far outnumbered by instances of 
convergence.   We found strong evidence of declining emphasis for one of two issues studied, 
and more moderate evidence for the other.   While some parties continued to ignore issues 
which were emphasized in their federation’s Euromanifestos, numerous parties did begin to 
recognize such issues, and no party adopted a new direction (+ or -) contrary to that of its 
federation. 
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While some may justifiably note that our evidence of support is far from universal, it does seem 
to us that the bigger story line is that – even with all of the limitations of our analyses – the 
glass is at least half full.  With all of the domestic political pressures on national parties, should 
anyone expect to find marked convergence on all issues, or every issue emphasis and tone of a 
Euromanifesto duplicated in all member parties’ national platforms?  We certainly think not.  
Again, our analyses are so limited, and hence our findings so tentative, that it would be 
foolhardy to claim that we have demonstrated that “Europe” has dramatically influenced 
parties’ manifestos at the national level.  But there is substantial evidence here with which to 
suggest that Europe could indeed matter for some issues and to some significant degree for 
national parties’ issue profiles. 
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